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Abstract
It is widely accepted that younger children can act as saviour siblings by donating 
cord blood or bone marrow to their gravely-ill brothers or sisters. However, it is under 
dispute whether these procedures are in the best interests of the child. This article 
suggests that parents may be relying on a thinly-veiled interfamilial approach, where 
the wider benefit to the whole family is used to justify the procedure to the Human 
Tissue Authority in the United Kingdom. This article suggests that the merging of 
familial interests to validate a non-therapeutic bone marrow harvest on a child forces 
altruism in a patient too young to understand, rendering the harvests unlawful under 
current law.
Keywords
interfamilial principle – saviour siblings – Human Tissue Authority – bone marrow 
donation – minors
1 Introduction
The law on saviour siblings in the United Kingdom starts and ends with one 
case: Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam. 110. Connell J 
confirmed that in the absence of a physical benefit a donor must glean some 
kind of psychological benefit from a bone marrow donation for her best inter-
ests to be met. The donor in Re Y was an incompetent adult who had very little 
* LLB, LLM, L.Cherkassky@derby.ac.uk.
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awareness of the world around her, so the court used what appeared to be an 
interfamilial approach, relying on a probable improvement in the wider family 
unit to validate the harvest. 
The Human Tissue Authority has published guidelines — Code of Practice 6: 
Donation of Allogeneic Bone Marrow and Peripheral Blood Stem Cells for 
Transplantation (2014) — on the harvest of bone marrow from very young 
children and incompetent adults.1 It has the power to approve the procedure 
as being in the best interests of the child under the Human Tissue Act 2004 and 
the Human Tissue (Quality and Safety for Human Application) Regulations 
2007.2 The idea that a child could be harvested on the basis of wider benefits to 
family members should be urgently examined in light of the following statis-
tics provided by the HT Authority (see Table 1). 
Table 1 Statistics from the human tissue authority3
Year Child bone marrow/
blood stem cell 
cases approved
Cases
rejected
2007-2008 71 0
2008-2009 57 0
2009-2010 78 0
2010-2011 67 0
2011-2012 68 0
2012-2013 69 0
2013-2014 78 0
1    Code of Practice 6: Donation of Allogeneic Bone Marrow and Peripheral Blood Stem Cells 
for Transplantation, (2014); Human Tissue Authority, www.hta.gov.uk. Gillick competent chil-
dren can issue their own consent: Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority 
[1986] AC 112, per Lord Scarman, pp. 188-189.
2   Code of Practice, paras. 27, 65 and 107. The approval process is also described in clear detail 
under paras. 28, 30 and 31.
3   These statistics were requested from the Human Tissue Authority by the writer under the 
Data Protection Act in January 2015 and delivered via email.
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The consistent zero in the ‘cases rejected’ column is a cause for concern, and 
combined with the distress of the parents at the point of consent it is feared 
that objectivity may have been lost in the donation process. 
This article focuses strictly on the interfamilial principle and its poten-
tial application to very young saviour siblings. It will conclude that a familial 
approach to best interests conflicts with the notion of paramountancy under 
the Children Act 1989 rendering the harvest of her bone marrow unlawful 
under current law.4
2 Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam. 110
The House of Lords judgment in Quintavalle v. Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (and Secretary of State for Health) [2005] 2 A.C. 561 con-
firmed that a saviour sibling can be created during fertility treatment using 
Preimplantation Tissue Typing (PTT) in accordance with the desires of the 
mother.5 The law under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
was changed to allow this to happen under schedule 2, paragraph 1ZA(1)(d). 
However, just because the law has authorised the creation of saviour siblings 
during fertility treatment (or the child is conceived naturally), it does not 
mean that the newly born child can be legitimately harvested for its bone mar-
row in law. The trespass to her body will only be lawful if a tangible therapeutic 
benefit (physical or psychological) can be found in herself to exist.
Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam. 110 was a strange 
moment in law. It was the first clear confirmation that an invasive medical pro-
cedure could be performed upon an incompetent adult patient with no direct 
therapeutic benefit.6 Connell J found that the incompetent adult donor (Y) was 
severely handicapped and did not know that her older sister was sick. She only 
had a trifling connection to her mother.7 There was clearly no physical thera-
peutic benefit to Y to undergo a bone marrow harvest, but more  importantly, 
4   The welfare of the saviour sibling in regards to section 13(5) of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 and the inherent jurisdiction of wardship has been canvassed else-
where: L. Cherkassky, ‘The Wrong Harvest: The Law on Saviour Siblings’, The International 
Journal of Law, Policy and Family 1 (2015) 1-20.
5   Per Lord Hoffman at paras.14, 22 and 24; Lord Brown at para. 62.
6   It has long been established that the interests of a child are influenced by the wider inter-
ests of the family, but in the context of non-therapeutic medical procedures on incompetent 
adults, a general benefit to the whole family was a new idea. 
7   At pp. 112 and 115.
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there was no obvious psychological benefit either because of her lack of under-
standing of the world around her. 
In the United States, Curran v. Bosze (1990) 566 N.E.2d 1319 established that 
a bone marrow harvest upon a young child must satisfy the following three 
requirements:
1. the consenting parent must understand the risks and benefits of the 
procedure;
2. there must be emotional support from the person with parental 
responsibility;
3. there must be an existing close relationship between the donor and 
the sick child.8
The Curran judgment may have been geared towards child donors, but Connell 
J took inspiration from the third prong of the test, and validated the harvest 
in Re Y on the grounds that there were enough familial connections between 
the mother, sister and donor combined to manufacture a general emotional, 
psychological and social benefit to Y:
In this situation, the [donor] would clearly be harmed by the reduction 
in or loss of contact with her mother. Accordingly, it is to the benefit of 
the [donor] that she should act as donor to her sister, because in this way 
her positive relationship with her mother is most likely to be prolonged. 
Further, if the transplant occurs, this is likely to improve the [donor’s] 
relationship with her mother who in her heart clearly wishes it to take 
place and also to improve her relationship with the plaintiff who will 
be eternally grateful to her . . . it is relevant to ask the question, why sub-
ject the [donor] to this process? To this the answer, in my judgment . . . is 
because it is to her emotional, psychological and social benefit.9
The decision in Re Y requires justification. Firstly, the incompetent adult donor 
(Y) was barely aware of who her mother was, making the likelihood that she 
would benefit from her continued visits highly doubtful (i.e., these could have 
easily been replaced by a social worker or a carer). Calvo J made it very clear 
in Curran that there must be an existing close relationship between the donor 
8   Per Calvo J, pp. 1343-1344. Calvo J did not approve the harvest, and the child in this case died.
9   [1997] Fam. 110, pp. 115-116. This was supported by writers including: R. Bailey-Harris, Re Y 
(Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) [1996] 2 FLR 787 (case note) in [1997] Fam. Law. 
91, at p. 92.
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and the recipient for a psychological benefit to ‘realistically be found to exist’.10 
Secondly, the judgment in Re Y appeared to focus more on the wellbeing of the 
mother rather than the donor herself, who it was predicted. would die should 
the donation not go ahead.11 In conclusion, Re Y did not correctly follow the 
guidance in Curran v. Bosze and stepped out on its own, generating a new con-
cept of interfamilial interests. The requirement for a direct benefit between 
close siblings is substituted for a general familial benefit focusing not on the 
donor at the centre of the action but the plight of family members. This is the 
crux of the interfamilial principle, whereby the interests of the whole family 
are thrown into one melting pot and the needs of third parties override, sub-
sume, dictate, influence or merge with the best interests of the donor. There is 
room for this to happen in the best interests test for incompetent adults (first 
designed in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1) because the com-
mon law can be interpreted as widely or as narrowly as is necessary, but in 
regards to children only the child is paramount under the Children Act 1989 
(explored below) leaving no room for manoeuvre.12 Re Y and the principle 
therein should not be applied to child donors. 
Disappointingly, the ethos of the decision in Re Y appears to feature in the 
Human Tissue Authority guidelines on child donation:
Paragraph 82: A person with parental responsibility can consent to stor-
age and use of bone marrow for transplantation on behalf of the child, if 
the donation is assessed as being in the child’s overall best interests, tak-
ing into account not only the medical but also emotional, psychological 
and social aspects of the donation, as well as the risks.13 
The influence of Re Y on the Human Tissue Authority guidelines means 
that parents of saviour siblings can place a selection of wider familial/social 
 interests on the table to help sway the decision in favour of harvest. These could 
include: ‘the siblings would have each other to play with’, ‘they would support 
10   (1990) 566 N.E.2d 1319, pp. 1343-4.
11   [1997] Fam. 110, pp. 112, 113 and 115.
12    Rather tellingly, Re Y has been considered by only one appeal case and mentioned by only 
five others since its decision in 1997: R v. HFEA ex parte Blood [1999] Fam. 151; St George’s 
Healthcare NHS Trust v. S [1998] 3 W.L.R. 936; R v. HFEA [2003] EWCA Civ. 667; HL v. United 
Kingdom (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 32; S v. Rochdale MBC [2008] EWHC 3283 (Fam.) and A NHS 
Trust v. DE [2013] EWHC 2562 (Fam.). 
13    Code of Practice 6: Donation of Allogeneic Bone Marrow and Peripheral Blood Stem Cells 
for Transplantation, (2014), Human Tissue Authority, www.hta.gov.uk, emphasis added.
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each other throughout life’, ‘we would be a complete family unit’ or ‘none of us 
want to experience the death of a family member’. There is no doubt that these 
propositions are felt by the parents but they are merely speculative for a newly 
born or toddling donor.
The Human Tissue Authority may be adopting the interfamilial approach 
to be fairer to the family unit as a whole, but would it be legally acceptable 
to validate a trespass to the child in this way? It is time to explore the inter-
familial principle to see how it aligns with the current legal principles of wel-
fare as a potential approach for validating a bone marrow harvest on a very 
young donor.
3 The Interfamilial Principle and Its Application to Saviour Siblings
A saviour sibling is likely to be harvested for bone marrow when it is very 
young, perhaps days or weeks after birth depending on how sick the older sib-
ling is (especially if it was conceived via fertility treatment for this purpose). 
There are three potential psychological benefits available to a donor child to 
satisfy her best interests in law. The first one takes the form of treats or rewards, 
but these are specifically excluded from the donation process by the Human 
Tissue Authority Code of Practice:
Paragraph 28: Before the HT Authority can approve such cases, the regu-
lations require that the HT Authority must be satisfied that: 
(i) no reward has been, or is to be, given.
Paragraph 87: Deciding what constitutes reward or coercion can be a dif-
ficult judgment to make, and these issues should be explored thoroughly 
by Accredited Assessor’s within interviews.
Paragraph 88: Children are often given treats to compensate for an 
unpleasant experience, such as going into hospital or undergoing a pain-
ful procedure, and the form of treat is likely to vary considerably between 
different families and different cultures. However, some types of treat 
may be sufficiently desirable that there is a risk that they could induce 
the child to donate.
Paragraph 90: If there is any doubt about whether the child is donating 
because of the promise of a reward, or the child is being coerced to 
donate through any other means, the AA should seek guidance from 
other Accredited Assessor’s, and raise their concerns within their report 
to the HT Authority.
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The second type of psychological benefit could be an emotional one, such as a 
feeling of pride, altruism or happiness at being able to help a family member. 
This higher level of thinking is usually associated with adults who donate bone 
marrow or kidneys, not babies or toddlers or very young children. 
Writers have suggested a third type of psychological benefit — a ‘gen-
eral completeness’ in the family unit otherwise known as the interfamilial 
approach — where the needs of the wider family are incorporated into the 
best interests test. Its main aim is to ensure that the wider interests of the fam-
ily are met. The legal question is, should a transplant team be able to perform 
an invasive procedure on a child simply because it offers an immediate ben-
efit to the wider family? The Human Tissue Authority guidelines on donation 
clearly state that in the event of a disagreement on best interests, the jurisdic-
tion of the High Court should be sought:
Paragraph 107: Where a child is a potential bone marrow donor and not 
competent to consent, a person with parental responsibility can consent 
to donation on behalf of the child if the donation is assessed as being 
in the child’s overall best interests. However, where there is a dispute 
between persons with parental responsibility, or between them and the 
clinicians looking after the child, or there is a doubt as to best interests, 
the court should be asked to rule in advance.
Paragraph 109: If the court is asked to consider the matter, the welfare of 
the prospective donor child will be the court’s paramount consideration 
and not the welfare of the recipient. The ‘welfare checklist’ which is set 
out in the Children Act 1989 will be considered by the court in determin-
ing the application.14
These are important provisions because they provide objectivity in a situ-
ation where emotions run very high. The welfare test under section 1(1) of 
the Children Act 1989 states that with respect to the upbringing of the child, 
the child’s welfare is the paramount consideration. Relevant factors under 
section 1(3) include his wishes and feelings, physical and emotional needs, the 
effect on him of any change, his age, sex and background, any harm he is at risk 
of suffering, and the capabilities of his parents to meet his needs. In the event 
that the welfare test is applied to a child donor (which has not happened in a 
14    Code of Practice 6, ibid. It can be inferred from these paragraphs that if the parents do not 
disagree, the HT Authority will use its full discretion without any legal interference.
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high profile case yet), the common law has already provided strong hints that 
an interfamilial approach would not be well received. The possibilities can be 
split into three sub-categories: (i) subsuming the rights of the child into the 
rights of the parents; (ii) a melting pot of familial interests; and (iii) a balancing 
act between siblings. The common law has ruled on these wider approaches to 
welfare in other child cases and has rejected every single one, because they do 
not support the paramountancy of the child.
3.1 Subsuming the Rights of the Child
Parents of saviour siblings are in a very difficult position. They have to harm 
one child to save their other child. Parental consent is not often questioned 
because there is an assumption that the proposed medical procedure is in 
the best interests of the child. Bone marrow harvests are different, because a 
psychological benefit must be proven to justify the trespass to the child and 
this is incredibly difficult to do in very young children, leaving parents free 
to instil their own altruistic ideals into the newly born or toddling child in 
the hope that this will constitute the required benefit. There is some support 
for this approach. Ross, for example, believes that the autonomy of the child 
should be subsumed into the autonomy of the parents for the interests of the 
wider family: 
. . . if the organ is donated to another family member, then the child is 
advancing the family’s own interests, which is a means to promoting the 
child’s own interests. . . . although a child who is asked to serve as a donor 
may dissent because he fears the physical pain, the parents must have the 
power to override his narrow self-interest for the wellbeing of his sibling 
and the family as a whole . . . family autonomy warrants, indeed requires, 
this discretionary freedom.15
These comments may be unhelpful. Firstly, it is dangerous to suggest that 
parents should be exempt from the welfare test so they can raise their fam-
ily according to their own vision — there are a small handful of families who 
have negligent and frankly dangerous visions for their children, highlighting 
the need for an objective test in welfare cases. Secondly, paramountancy is not 
a “narrow self-interest”; it is a vital tool to ensure the national and interna-
tional rights of the child. To completely subsume the autonomy of the child 
15    L.F. Ross, ‘Moral Grounding for the Participation of Children as Organ Donors’, Journal of 
Law, Medicine and Ethics 21 (1993) 251, pp. 253, 254 and 255. Also see: L.F. Ross, ‘Justice For 
Children: The Child as Organ Donor’, Bioethics 8(2) (1994) 105, pp. 110, 114, 115, 118 and 119.
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would mean a substitution of her rights for those of the wider family and her 
autonomy and bodily integrity would be lost.
In this respect, the interfamilial principle could allow altruism to be por-
trayed through the child on behalf of the parents, almost like a substituted 
judgment.16 The concept of forced altruism and its effects have been discussed 
in the literature on saviour siblings and it becomes clear that altruism is a 
higher mind-set that cannot be enforced upon a young child, per Glannon:
Altruism is the “willingness to act in consideration of the interests of per-
sons, without the need of ulterior motives” [and] “a regard for the good of 
another person for his own sake, or conduct motivated by such a regard”. 
As an altruistic act, organ donation is not a quid pro quo; one does not do 
it on the condition that one will receive some psychological benefit in 
return. What makes these acts laudable or praiseworthy is that they are 
freely chosen at some cost or risk of harm to oneself and are directed at 
individuals to whom one stands in no special relationship.17 
Crouch and Elliott agree that altruism is simply not in the nature of young 
children:
. . . if the donor is not mentally developed to a sufficient degree, he will 
not only fail to understand why he is in the hospital and why he has been 
physically harmed, he will also fail to understand the important role that 
he has played in the care of his sibling. Thus he may well not receive any 
psychological benefits as a result of his donation.18
Altruism is a psychological benefit that could fulfil the best interests test 
for adult donors (and perhaps Gillick competent children) because they are 
capable of acquiring it, but it is clear that a baby or toddler cannot donate 
bone marrow altruistically. The idea put forward by Ross that parents should 
override the rights of the child to promote good Samaritanism may simply be 
a strategy to instil their own altruistic ideals into their child. Griner speaks of 
16    The concept of substituted judgment and parents of saviour siblings has been canvassed 
elsewhere: L. Cherkassky, ‘Children and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment’, Medical 
Law International 1 (2015) 1-23.
17    A. Glannon and L.F. Ross, ‘Do Genetic Relationships Create Moral Obligations in Organ 
Transplantation?’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 11 (2002) 153, pp. 153 and 154.
18    R. Crouch and C. Elliott, ‘Moral Agency and the Family: The Case of Living Related Organ 
Transplantation’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 8 (1999) 275, at p. 282.
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a compulsion by the parents to force their priorities and responsibilities upon 
the donor child:
The parent-child relationship is not the same as a sibling relationship. 
While a parent may feel obliged to donate an organ to a child, a sibling 
may not necessarily feel the same compulsion. This is especially true 
when the siblings are very young and may only be able to appreciate 
the familial relationship in its most rudimentary aspects. The balanc-
ing test then becomes a matter of imposing the parent’s view of famil-
ial obligation on the child who may have a different set of priorities and 
responsibilities.19 
Ladd agrees that ‘parental consent without child assent would amount to 
requiring of a child a degree of altruism that we do not ever require of adults’.20 
Altruism was discussed in Curran v. Bosze 566 N.E.2d 1319 (1990) and Calvo 
J believed that it could be as much as twenty years before the psychological 
benefits of a bone marrow donation are felt by the donor child.21 He also sug-
gested that altruism should be present at the time of the harvest as a motivating 
factor — not in future to retrospectively justify the harvest — and that motiva-
tion and intention could not be supplied after the fact.22 A definitive passage 
by Wilson J in Re C (A Child) (HIV Test) [2000] Fam. 48, however, removed any 
doubt as to the rights of the parents to subsume the rights of their child into 
their own when he stated that ‘if the father regards the rights of a tiny baby as 
subsumed within the rights of the parents, he is wrong. This baby has rights 
of her own. They can be considered nationally or internationally’.23 The High 
Court plays the role of the reasonable parent in difficult medical cases. The 
wishes of the parents to either be included in deliberations of welfare, to sub-
sume the rights of their child into their own or to instil their own altruistic 
ideals into the child are rejected in favour of the welfare of the child under 
s.1(3) of the Children Act 1989 no matter how grave the circumstances are, 
19    R.W. Griner, ‘Live Organ Donations Between Siblings and the Best Interest Standard: Time 
for Stricter Judicial Intervention’, Georgia State University Law Review 10 (1994) 589, at 
p. 603.
20    R.E. Ladd, ‘The Child as Living Donor: Parental Consent and Child Assent’, Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 13 (2004) 143, pp. 146-147.
21    At p. 1335. The benefit was not to be ‘one of personal, individual altruism in an abstract, 
theoretical sense’ at p. 1343.
22   Ibid., p. 1336.
23   At page 61.
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rendering this subcategory of the interfamilial principle invalid. It is often dis-
appointing for parents to learn that their views have no influence on the wel-
fare test but if, in a child bone marrow donation case, the judge found it to be 
in the best interests of the child to donate bone marrow to her older sibling, 
the decision would have had nothing to do with her parents. Judges can choose 
to listen to and consider their views, but nothing more. 
3.2 A Melting Pot of Familial Interests
The second subcategory of the interfamilial principle is probably the most 
common, supporting a long and thin psychological benefit spread over the 
whole family unit as opposed to a single benefit to the donor child. This ben-
efit is phrased in typically emotive terms, such as “the whole family would 
benefit from having both children alive and well”. The avoidance of death is 
also found under this subcategory, where parents may argue that the act of 
harvest prevents the saviour sibling from suffering the grief of loss. The Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority has adopted this approach by incor-
porating the grief of loss into its Preimplantation Tissue Typing guidelines: ‘if 
a medical procedure, such as a bone marrow transplant, would save the life 
of a sibling, it is likely to be in the best interests of the child, since to lose a 
sibling is psychologically damaging’.24 The decision in Re Y also hinged on 
the avoidance of death and its decision was supported by writers.25 A direct 
avoidance of death can be seen in one of the oldest saviour sibling cases in 
the U.S. named Masden v. Harrison No.68651 Eq., Massachusetts, 12 June 1957.26 
The kidney donation was validated on the grounds that the death of the sick 
brother would have a negative psychological impact on the donor.27 
The decisions in Re Y and Masden v. Harrison involved older donors, so 
the death of the sick sibling may have had some kind of psychological effect, 
but it would be pure speculation to say that a newly born or toddling donor 
will be effected by the same event because they have no understanding of 
24    Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Report, ‘Preimplantation Tissue Typing’, 
(2004), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, http://www.hfea.gov.uk, at 
para. 25.
25    L.A. Jansen, ‘Child Organ Donation, Family Autonomy, and Intimate Attachments’, 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 13 (2004) 133, pp. 139-140; S. Sheldon and 
S. Wilkinson, ‘Hashmi and Whitaker: An Unjustifiable and Misguided Distinction?’, 
Medical Law Review 12(2) (2004) 137, at p. 142.
26    A kidney donation was required between twins (aged 19). They were both competent, but 
the age of majority was 21. The parents could not consent to the procedure in law either, 
so the court had to ponder an alternative avenue to consent.
27   Crouch and Elliott, supra note 18, at p. 278.
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mortality. There will certainly be an appreciation of a gap in the family tree in 
future years, but this is the case in every family — death cannot be postponed. 
A dissenting judge in another old U.S. case on donation — Strunk v. Strunk 
(1969) 445 S.W. 2d 145 Ky. — came to the conclusion that: ‘the loss of a close 
relative or a friend to a six-year old child is not of a major import’.28 Parents 
could not argue, therefore, that a bone marrow harvest would prevent grief in 
the donor child because it is purely conjectural. 
It is naïve, of course, to believe that the death of an older sibling would not 
have any effect on a younger sibling. The wording of the welfare test does state: 
(c) the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances, 
(d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of which the court 
considers relevant.
Might there be room for the natural death of a family member to be incorporated 
into the welfare test as a change in circumstances or a characteristic that could 
have a negative effect on the donor child? It is suggested that paragraphs (c) 
and (d) are more likely to refer to physical and psychological changes resulting 
from a legal decision such as removal into foster care. The inclusion of a family 
illness into the welfare test would be unfair to the saviour sibling if he was a 
potential cure for the illness, because the court would feel obliged to validate 
the harvest on the grounds that it would be for his own good to regard him as 
a treatment to be administered. The welfare test would turn into a vehicle for 
the harvesting of children for bone marrow.
This leads us on to an additional complication: awareness. The donor child 
must have awareness of a psychological benefit for it to manifest. The interfa-
milial principle attempts to plug this gap by stretching the psychological benefit 
far and wide. The Children Act 1989 does not comment on awareness but does 
mention the child’s age: ‘Section 1(3)(a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings 
of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding)’.
In a case of bone marrow harvest, a younger child would only have a rudi-
mentary understanding of the procedure compared to an older child. Re A 
(Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 F.L.R. 549 confirmed that when deliberating best 
interests the case ‘must be proved’.29 This suggests a tangible — not a specula-
tive — physical or psychological benefit and it is impossible for a child donor 
to derive such a benefit if he has no knowledge of it. The suggestion that she 
28   At p. 150.
29   Per Butler-Sloss L.J. at p. 555.
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would simply benefit from ‘having a sibling around’ or ‘having a complete fam-
ily’ is not enough according to Calvo J in Curran v. Bosze (1990) 566 N.E.2d 1319:
It is not in the best interest of either Allison or James [the twins] to 
undergo the proposed bone marrow harvesting procedure. . . it is not pos-
sible to discover the child’s likely treatment/non-treatment preferences 
by examining the child’s philosophical, religious and moral views, life 
goals, values about the purpose of life and the way it should be lived, and 
attitudes toward sickness, medical procedures, suffering and death . . . at 
the age of three and a half, it is very difficult if not impossible to predict 
what a specific individual will do in a specific circumstance at a specific 
point of time in the future.30
There are plenty of medical cases (U.K. and U.S.) to confirm that patient 
awareness and best interests are tied together, including Strunk v. Strunk (1969) 
445 S. W. 2d 145 Ky, Hart v. Brown (1972) 289 A. 2d 386, Conn. Super Ct. and 
Little v. Little (1979) 576 S. W. 2d 493 Tex. for the U.S. (donation cases), and 
Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] A.C. 199, Re F (Mental Patient: 
Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C. 1, Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] A.C. 789, Re A 
(Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 F.L.R. 549 and An NHS Trust v. MB [2006] EWHC 
507 for the U.K. (welfare cases). The High Court in the UK has not, so far, vali-
dated a non-therapeutic medical procedure on a child for purely speculative 
psychological reasons such as ‘she can share her life with her sibling’ or ‘she 
will be so much happier in the future knowing that she donated’. In light of 
the Human Tissue Authority statistics above, does this mean that awareness of 
a psychological benefit has been found in every single child donor case since 
records began in 2007?
The wishes of the parents to spread the required psychological benefit far 
and wide across the family unit to constitute the best interests of the child 
is rejected under the common law. It would also be unacceptable to suggest 
that the prevention of the death of a family member is enough justification to 
trespass upon a child in an invasive manner.31 The saviour sibling must clearly 
glean her own tangible psychological benefit from the bone marrow harvest 
and awareness of that benefit is vital for it to manifest. A strong relationship 
30    Per Calvo J, pp. 1343, 1344, 1319, 1326 and 1336. Bosze argued in response that if Jean Pierre 
was kept alive, the twins would have the opportunity to get to know him. This speculative 
future benefit did not hold any weight in court.
31    Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam. 147 is distinguishable 
on the grounds that if no surgery was authorised, both children would have died.
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with the sick sibling appears to be good evidence of this. The only avenue 
left for parents who wish to use the interfamilial principle to validate a bone 
marrow harvest upon their young child is the potential balancing of interests 
between the sick and the saviour sibling.
3.3 Balancing Act between Siblings
Re Y took the ‘balancing exercise’ approach. A more interesting perspective is 
that of Pennings, who suggests that a balancing act will ensure that the sick 
child is not neglected:
The relationship between donor and recipient functions in an indirect 
way: it explains why the donor has an interest in the wellbeing of the 
recipient. To the extent that the wellbeing of the others is part of one’s 
own wellbeing, the person is helping himself. In fact, it can be argued that 
refusing this use (e.g. not agreeing to the bone marrow donation of one 
child if there is a serious chance that its sibling can be saved) would be an 
unacceptable neglect of the sick child’s interests. Being informed of the 
fact that you were conceived to help your sibling may give a greater sense 
of self-esteem and self-worth . . . compared with most other persons, who 
are conceived by accident or without any conscious thought at all, this 
child already has a reason to exist.32
It is debatable that the interests of the sick and the saviour child should be 
balanced against each other as they have different legal interests: the sick child 
seeks a right to life whereas the saviour child seeks protection from trespass 
to the person. Similarly, the harm to the saviour child (needles, anaesthetic) is 
unfairly overshadowed by the potential death of the sick child. Pennings has 
described the substantial burden on the donor child:
It could be argued that a heavy burden is placed on the donor child. The 
transplantation may fail and this may give the child a fundamental sense 
of unworthiness and deficiency and a feeling of not being able to live up 
to the expectations.33 
32    G. Pennings, R. Schots and I. Liebaers. ‘Ethical Considerations on Pre-Implantation 
Genetic Diagnosis for HLA Typing to Match a Future Child as a Donor of Haematopoietic 
Stem Cells to a Sibling’, Human Reproduction 17(2) (2002) 534, pp. 536 and 537. 
33   Ibid., at pp. 537 and 538.
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Jecker adds a catalogue of potential psychological harms to the saviour child:
Children aren’t medicine manufactured for other people. Conceiving 
children to benefit others violates a principle that should guide ethical 
decision making regarding becoming a parent; namely, doing what will 
be best from the potential child’s point of view. [The donor] is likely to 
suffer psychological harm as a result of being conceived for the purpose 
of benefitting her sister. She might be prone in the future to regard her 
worth as conditional on the benefits she can provide others. She might 
harbour resentment toward her parents for choosing to conceive her for 
this purpose, or toward her sister for reaping benefits from her concep-
tion. These feelings could present formidable obstacles to living relation-
ships within the family, and thereby handicap [the donor] in the future. 
Family relationships profoundly shape our relationships with persons 
outside the family circle, and they influence the kind of person we strive 
to become.34
There are far more burdens to the saviour child, including bone fracture, bone 
infection, rupture of an artery, skin scarring, hypertension, anaemia, bro-
ken needles, blood transfusion, pain, fear of operations, fear of losing a body 
part, spite, resentment, refusal, force, manipulation, exploitation, guilt, rejec-
tion and being treated as an insurance policy.35 Delany goes one further and 
34    N.S. Jecker, ‘Conceiving a Child to Save a Child: Reproductive and Filial Ethics’, The Journal 
of Clinical Ethics 1(2) (1990) 99, at p. 100.
35    Life threatening risks that have been reported in real cases include non-fatal cardiac 
arrest, pulmonary embolus, aspiration pneumonitis, ventricular tachycardia and cerebral 
infarction (connected to the general anaesthetic): M.M. Bortin and C.D. Buckner, ‘Major 
Complications of Marrow Harvesting for Transplantation’, Experimental Hematology, 
(11)(10) (1983) 916-921, at p. 919. For further discussion of bone marrow harvest risks see: 
J. Hunter, ‘Consent for the Legally Incompetent Organ Donor’, Journal of Legal Medicine 
12(4) (1991) 535; Griner, supra note 19, 589; S. Holm, ‘The Child as Organ and Tissue 
Donor: Discussions in the Danish Council of Ethics’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare 
Ethics 13 (2004) 156; A. Spital, ‘Donor Benefit Is the Key to Justified Living Organ Donation’, 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 13 (2004) 105; S. Zinner, ‘Cognitive Development 
and Paediatric Consent to Organ Donation’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 13 
(2004) 125; and L.F. Ross and J.R. Thistlethwaite Jr., ‘Minors as Living Solid Organ Donors’, 
Paediatrics 122 (2008) 454. For an alternative look at the risks to the sick child, see: http://
www.chw.org/medical-care/macc-fund-center/conditions/hematology-and-blood- 
disorders/bone-marrow-transplantation, accessed on 31 March 2015.
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 suggests that a bone marrow harvest would be against the best interests of the 
donor child:
It is by no means clear that harvesting bone marrow from a child is legal. 
Neither statute nor case law specifically sanctions bone marrow dona-
tion by a child. Adopted by the House of Lords in Gillick and consistent 
with the philosophy of the Children Act 1989, [one approach] permits 
a medical procedure only if it serves the best interests of the child who 
undergoes it. Assessments based on factors such as [tests, anaesthetic, 
pain, discomfort, pressure, fear and disapproval] may show that bone 
marrow donation is not “in the best interests” of the donor. Indeed, they 
may conclude that a donation is against the child’s interests. When the 
proposed donor is too young to have established an emotional bond with 
the proposed recipient of the bone marrow the factors favouring the 
medical intervention appear to be outweighed by those against it.36
Unfortunately for parents of child donors the law has been very clear on the 
entangling of interests under the Children Act 1989 - the needs of other family 
members are excluded from the welfare test. This was confirmed in the follow-
ing cases:
• S v M [1972] A.C. 24;
• Re X (A Minor) (Wardship: Jurisdiction) [1975] Fam. 47;
• Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] A.C. 199;
• Re A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 F.L.R. 549;
• Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam. 147. 
The common law is clear: the welfare test is not applicable to the sick sibling 
because his plight would cause unfair prejudice and domination. The only 
instance where siblings can be balanced against one another in a welfare test 
is when they are both warded at the same time:
• Court of Appeal [1993] 1 FLR 883;
• Birmingham City Council v. H (A Minor) [1994] 2 AC 212.
Should parents try to instigate a balancing exercise between the sick and the 
saviour child to suggest that the discomfort to one is outweighed by the  benefit 
36    L. Delany, ‘Protecting Children from Forced Altruism: The Legal Approach’, British Medical 
Journal 312 (1996) 240.2.
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to the other it would grate against the principle of paramountancy under the 
Children Act 1989. It generates a grossly unfair advantage to the sick child whose 
illness is not the fault or problem of the saviour child. This detached attitude 
is difficult to accept, but the welfare test is designed to be strictly objective to 
ensure that the best interests of the warded child are paramount. The courts 
have already refused to measure the consequence of death as a result of McKay v. 
Essex Area Health Authority [1982] Q.B. 1166 when it was decided that a court 
cannot ‘evaluate non-existence’.37 A balancing act between family members 
plays no part in the welfare test under the Children Act 1989. There is no dis-
puting that the interfamilial approach has the best interests of both siblings 
at heart, but the autonomy of the donor child would have to be swallowed up 
to allow her to be used as a commodity to provide immediate relief to the sick 
child. It is highly unlikely that the welfare test under s.1 of the Children Act 
1989 was designed to be used as a vehicle for medical treatment in this way. 
Overall, it is clear that despite the plight of the sick sibling, the High Court, 
when applying the welfare test under s.1(3) of the Children Act 1989:
• will not allow parents to subsume the rights of the child into their own, 
• will not allow parents to force the child to behave altruistically, 
• will ensure that the child is aware of a psychological benefit to validate the 
harvest in law, 
• will make sure that the benefit is not social in nature or spread thinly 
throughout the family, and 
• will not allow the plight of the sick sibling to be balanced against the dis-
comfort of the saviour sibling unless both are warded at the same time. 
In conclusion, the interfamilial principle as a tool to validate a medical proce-
dure on a child has been widely avoided by the courts and would not neces-
sarily render a non-therapeutic bone marrow harvest upon a non-competent 
child lawful. The important question left to answer is why the Human Tissue 
Authority places significant weight upon parental consent and social factors 
to validate such a procedure at its discretion when the case law on medical 
treatments clearly rejects the familial approach to welfare in the event that no 
benefit can be found.
37    Per Lord Ackner, at p.1189. This case confirmed that there is no duty in law to ensure that 
a person does not exist (or to put it more accurately, there is no duty in law to perform an 
abortion). The U.S. courts came to the same conclusion in Gleitman v. Cosgrove 227 A.2d 
689 (N.J. 1967).
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4 Conclusion
A difficult case for the Human Tissue Authority would be the harvest of a newly 
born child created using PTT under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990. The distress of these parents would be intolerable if they were to be 
turned away at the last hurdle, having gone through a gruelling fertility treat-
ment process only to find that the harvest is not lawful. This loophole was 
ignored in Quintavalle, but just because the HFE Act 1990 made the creation of 
saviour siblings legal under schedule 2 paragraph 1ZA(1)(d) it does not mean 
that the harvest of bone marrow is legal. This also applies to saviour siblings 
conceived naturally too.
The fragments of law already existing clearly state that the donor child must 
be aware of a close existing relationship to her sibling to derive a benefit from 
donation (Curran & Re Y ), this benefit must be proven (Re A), and only the 
interests of the donor child are paramount (1989 Act). The avenue used so far 
by parents and the Human Tissue Authority — the interfamilial approach — 
does not correspond with the law.
The need for objectivity in the donation is significantly increased when chil-
dren are involved because the procedure hinges on parental consent, turning 
the donation into a ‘family favour’ as opposed to a medical procedure. Lord 
Hoffman in Quintavalle assumed that once born the saviour sibling would be 
able to rely on the law for protection: ‘the [HFE] authority is in my opinion 
entitled to assume that a child conceived pursuant to its licence will, after 
birth, receive the full protection of the law’.38 There was no further elaboration 
on this point, but if he was referring to wardship it has not yet been invoked. 
The sense that the saviour sibling is simply being used as a commodity is very 
strong. It does not help that our only authority on sibling donation — Re Y 
(Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam. 110 — adopted the inter-
familial approach and merged the interests of the mother (who was frail) and 
the sick sibling (who had no relationship to the donor) with the incompetent 
donor to ensure that a psychological benefit was constructed. This decision 
should not have been incorporated into the Human Tissue Authority guide-
lines on bone marrow donations for children because the welfare test for 
children is very strict.39 How does the Human Tissue Authority know that 
the objective best interests of the child donor are met when the welfare test 
under s.1 of the Children Act 1989 is only referred to in the event of a  parental 
38    R (Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (and Secretary of State 
for Health) [2005] 2 A.C. 561, at para. 38.
39   At para. 78.
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disagreement?40 In light of the (relatively) small number of bone marrow 
donations from children every year, could it be possible to seek court consent 
in every case to ensure that the welfare of every donor child is met? It appears 
that the needs of the donor child are currently trumped by the needs of third 
parties which is the very threat the welfare test was designed to prevent.
40   At paras. 107 and 109 of the Code of Practice, supra note 13.

